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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MELVIN A. COOK and
WANDA G. COOK, his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
Case No. 15811

vs.
NOEL L. COOK, et al,
Defendant and
Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiffs-Respondents,
hereinafter referred to as Plaintiffs, in two counts, to-wit:
in Count I they seek to foreclose a mortgage on real property securing an indebtedness of Defendant-Appellant Noel
L. Cook, hereinafter referred to as Defendant, to them in
the amount of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00); in
Count II they seek to recover Three Thousand Nine Hundred
Forty-Four Dollars ($3,944.00) which Plaintiffs loaned to
Defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court found that Defendant was indebted
to Plaintiffs in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Dollars

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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($13,000.00), that said indebtedness was due and payable,
that notwithstanding Plaintiffs' demands, Defendant had
failed to make payment as agreed and was in default and
that Plaintiffs held a valid real estate mortgage securing
the aforesaid indebtedness of Defendant and were entitled
as a matter of law to foreclose upon it.

The Court also

granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count
II of their Complaint.

Defendant moved for a new trial,

but his notion was denied.

An appeal to this Court followed,

Case No. 14976, and the judgment of the lower Court was
affirmed.

Defendant moved for an order vacating the judg-

ment which motion was denied on the 29th day of March, 1978.
This appeal followed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a new trial on all issues and
requests that this Court consider newly discovered evidence.
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs agree with that portion of Defendant's
statement of facts admitting that he was in debt to Plaintiffs in the sum of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00)

- 2 -
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and that said indebtedness was secured by a mortgage executed by the said Defendant.

However, because of the

misleading nature of other allegations made in Defendant's
statement of facts, and the fact that said statement is
not supported by the Record, Plaintiffs deem it necessary
to supplement and explain said statement as follows:
On April 13, 1976, Defendant filed an answer to
Plaintiffs' Complaint wherein he admitted all allegations
made by Plaintiffs in Count I thereof.

Record at 25.

Among other things Defendant admitted that on May 22,
1972, he executed a promissory note to Plaintiffs in exchange for their loan to him of Twelve Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($12,500.00), which note was secured by a mortgage
on certain real property.

Record at 2-3, 25.

He further

admitted that on June 29, 1972, following the loan to him
of an additional Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), he executed
and delivered to Plaintiffs a real estate mortgage on the
same property which was to replace the first and serve as
security for both the $12,500.00 and the $500.00 debts.
Record at 3, 25.

Defendant also admitted that the promis-

sory note for $12,500.00 and the indebtedness of $500.00
were both due and owing, and that despite Plaintiffs' demands
for payment he had paid no part of either obligation.

Record

at 3, 25.
- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In addition to the admissions made by Defendant
in his answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint herein, he failed
to raise any affirmative defenses.

Record at 25.

Despite

the fact that eight months passed between the time the
Defendant filed his answer, as aforesaid, and the time of
trial (December 14, 1976) at no time did he amend or seek
leave to amend his answer to include any affirmative
defenses.
At the time of trial, though Defendant was present
in person and was represented by counsel, he at no time
contested the accuracy, authenticity or validity of the
documents and testimony presented by Plaintiffs in evidence
of their claims, nor did he take exception to the findings
of the Court.

Record at 90-97, 166-68.

Moreover, Defen-

dant, through his attorney Omer J. Call, stated in open
Court that he had no objection to the granting of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I I of their Complaint
and to the filing and docketing of that judgment in its
proper position with respect to other judgments and liens
so that it could be paid out of any foreclosure sale.
Record at 2-3, 75-83, 86-87; Transcript at 48.
On February 4, 1977 following entry of the summary
judgment and the decree of foreclosure on December 27, 1976,
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and January 10, 1977, Defendant moved for a new trial,
alleging as grounds therefore the discovery of new evidence and witnesses and other grounds which he raises on
this appeal.

Record at 110-144.

Among other things he

sought to introduce for the first time the affirmative
defense of waiver.

Record at 123.

On March 30, 1977,

Defendant's Motion for a new trial was denied.
164-173.

An

Record at

appeal to this Court followed and the judgment

of the lower Court was affirmed in all respects.
at 178-180.

Record

No petition for rehearing was filed.

On January 24, 1978, Defendant filed in the lower
Court a petition to "set aside the Supreme Court verdict
for further investigation of a willful tort or more specifically fraud" and on February 14, 1978, a motion to vacate
judgment was filed.

Record at 191, 212-214.

On March 29,

1978, an order denying said motions was entered.

Record at

311-313.
On March 31, 1978, a "writ of injunction" signed
by Defendant only was filed, Record at 314-315; on April 11,
1978, a "request extension of time to make motion for new
trial" was filed, Record at 318; on April 13, 1978, an
"amendment on motion for a new trial and to correct the
judgment" was filed, Record at 319-321; on April 17, 1978,
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a "motion for amendment continuance and to correct the
judgment" was filed, Record at 333; on April 25, 1978, a
"supplemental amendment and motion to correct judgment"
and a "notice of appeal" were filed, Record at 336-347; on
the 1st day of May, 1978, a "motion for deletion and addition to supplemental amendment" was filed, Record at 348358; on Nay 2, 1978, a "motion to strike or delete from a
filed appeal" was filed, Record at 359; on May 4, 1978, a
"motion on estoppel in pais or equitable estoppel," a
"motion to set aside satisfaction of the judgment" and
a "bill of illegality" were filed, Record at 360-362; on
May 9, 1978, a "motion to correct a statement in the supplemental amendment or to add a statement" was filed, Record
at 367; and on May 15, 1978, a letter from Defendant to

t~

Box Elder County Sheriff's Office wherein Defendant represents that Mr. Justice Maughn of this Court, speaking
for the body of justices, had offered a mandamus or compelling document on behalf of Defendant and an "objection
of sheriff sale position of sustained occupancy and possession" were filed, Record at 385-386.

All of the foregoing

documents were filed by Defendant with the Clerk of Box
Elder County and none of the motions was ever noticed.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
THIS APPEAL FROM THE PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ENTERED ON DECEMBER 27, 1976
WAS NOT TIMELY FILED.
This appeal is taken by Defendant "from the judgment entered into this action on March 27, 1978 and partial
judgment ~ntered on December 27, 1976."

Record at 347.

Since there was no judgment entered on March 27, 1978,
Plaintiffs assume that Defendant is referring to the order
denying motion of Defendants Noel L. Cook and Helen Cook
to vacate judgment and order vacating temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which was entered on
March 29, 1978.

Record at 311-313.

The "partial judgment"

entered on December 27, 1976, is the partial sununary judgment
in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Noel L. Cook on
Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint which was entered on
December 27, 1976.

Record at 086-088.

Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in relevant part:
When an appeal is permitted from a district court to the Supreme Court, the
time within which an appeal may be taken
shall be one month from the entry of the
judgment or order appealed from unless
a shorter time is provided by law, except
that upon a showing of excusable neglect
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based on a failure of a party to learn
of the entry of the judgment the district court in any action may extend
the time for appeal not exceeding one
month from the expiration of the original time herein prescribed. The
running of the time for appeal is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant
to any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal fixed
in this subdivision commences to run
and is to be computed from the entry in
the minutes of any of the following
orders made upon a timely motion under
such rules: granting or denying a
motion for judgment under Rule 50(b),
or granting or denying a motion for
judgment under Rule 52(b) to amend or
make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the
judgment would be required if the motion
is granted; or granting or denying a
motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend
the judgment; or denying a motion for
a new trial under Rule 59.
Each motion referred to in Rule 73(a), as aforesaid, to be
timely, must be filed within ten days after entry of the
judgment or order in question.
The partial summary judgment from which Defendant
now appeals was entered on December 27, 1976 and an order
denying Defendant's motion for a new trial was entered on
March 30, 1977.

None of the other motions referred to in

Rule 73(a) was timely filed by Defendant and the time for
Defendant to appeal from said partial summary judgment expire

- 8 -
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on May 2, 1977, a Monday.

Since this appeal was not filed

until April 25, 1978, it was not timely and should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Ratliff, Estate of, v.

Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571.
Point II
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY HELD THAT THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT II OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED.
In Count II of their Complaint Plaintiffs allege:
Defendant Noel L. Cook owes Plaintiffs
$3,944.68 for money lent by Plaintiffs to
said Defendant on or about the 1st day of
June, 1974, and the 14th day of November,
1974. Record at 004.
In his answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint Defendant
alleges:
Defendant denies having received $3,944.00
in June or November, 1974, as this case has
gone to appeal.
Record at 025.
On December 1, 1976, Plaintiffs filed a motion
for partial summary judgment against Defendant on Count II
of their Complaint and supported their motion with an affidavit and memorandum of points and authorities.
075-083.

Record at

No counter-affidavits or memoranda were filed by

Defendant and during the trial of this action Defendant,
through counsel, stated that he had no objection to the
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granting of the motion.

Transcript at 48.

On Defendant's

first appeal, this Count, relying on Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d
242, 516 P.2d 348 (1973), observed and held,
Plaintiff Melvin moved for summary
judgment on his cause of action for
$3,944 and filed an affidavit in
support thereof.
Before the motion
was heard trial began, at which time
the motion was renewed. Noel, who was
represented by counsel at trial, did
not object, nor did he file an affidavit or offer anything in opposition
to plaintiff's contention. The judgment on that count was therefore properly granted.
Record at 179.

Point III
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY PROPERLY HELD
THAT DEFENDA..NT CANNOT AVAIL HIMSELF OF
THE DEFENSES OF WAIVER AND IMPROPER
ACCELERATION OF THE MORTGAGE DUE DATE
AND THAT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIS I10TION
FOR A NEhT TRIAL WAS WITHOUT MERIT.
Although Defendant states in his Notice of Appeal
that he appeals from the order denying his motion to vacate
judgment which was entered on I1arch 29, 1978, he argues in
his brief that Plaintiffs waived their right to collect on
the obligation described in Count I of their Complaint,
that acceleration of the mortgage due date was improper
and that the Trial Court erred in denying his motion for

- 10
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a new trial

~n

March 30, 1977, all of which he argued on

his first appeal.

Brief of Defendant - Appellant at 6-17;

Brief of Defendant - Appellant on first appeal.
In Count I of their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege
that the sum of Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00),
together with interest, attorney's fees and costs, is now
due and payable.by Defendant to Plaintiffs, that no part
thereof has been paid notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs have demanded payment and that the Court should determine the amount due and owing, order that Plaintiffs' security
interest be foreclosed and that the property be sold as
provided by law to satisfy said amount and accruing costs.
Record at 001-005.

In his answer to Count I of Plaintiffs'

Complaint Defendant concedes all of the allegations thereof.
Record at 025.
In this appeal, as in the first appeal, Defendant
claims that Plaintiffs waived prompt payment when due and
that acceleration of the mortgage due date was improper.
In affirming the judgment of the Trial Court on the first
appeal, this Court observed and held:
On this appeal defendant attacks the
judgment and decree of foreclosure on
two grounds:
(1) that plaintiffs had
previously waived prompt payments when
due and (2) that acceleration of the
mortgage due date was improper.

-

11 -
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Concerning those contentions these observations are pertinent:
In his answer
to the mortgage foreclosure count, the
defendant had not only stated "Conceded"
but had failed to plead the two affirmative defenses he now attempts to raise.
Inasmuch as those issues were neither
presented nor tried in the district
court, there is no basis upon which we
could consider them on appeal.
Record
at 179.
In his first appeal, Defendant contended that
the Trial Court erred in denying his motion for a new trial,
having based his motion on claims of irregularity in the
proceedings of the Trial Court, or adverse party, accident
or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against, and newly discovered evidence which could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at
trial.
11.

Brief of Defendant - Appellant on first appeal at

On this claim this Court held:
Defendant's claim that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a new
trial is without merit.
He failed to
meet any requirement of Rule 59, U.R.
C.P. requisite to the granting of a new
trial.
Record at 179.
Defendant reasserts on this appeal that he should

have been given a new trial and bases his assertion on the
same claims.

Brief of Appellant - Defendant at 15.

In

support of his claims he states that the Trial Court abused
its discretion in the following particulars:

- 12 -
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a.

Judge refused to accept an only amendment
which violates the spirit of the federal
rules of civil procedure.

b.

At no time was Appellant permitted to take
witness stand to present an available
defense.

c.

The judge refused the Appellant opportunity sought to cross-examine the Respondent
in set-aside hearing on fraud without a jury
where the sole purpose was to obtain permission of Respondent for certain subpoena
information essential to his defense.

d.

The judge made little effort at simple
construction of circumstantial evidence
in possible fraud which violates the
principal duty of courts of equity dealing with real property.

e.

Early in the hearing the judge stated that
he was ready at that time to rule on the
case thus pointing up possible bias, prejudice and which he was not able to overcome.

There is no support in the record or in fact for the foregoing.

If it is Defendant's position that he should be given

a new trial on the hearing on his motion to vacate judgment,
then his position is wholly without merit.

No motion for a

new trial was ever filed, and if the motions filed on and
after April 11, 1978, are construed as motions for a new
trial they were not timely filed under Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure since they were filed more than ten
(10) days after entry of the order denying the motion to
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vacate judgment on March 29, 1978.

Only the "writ of

injunction" filed by Defendant on March 31, 1978, would
be timely and no request is made therein for a new trial.

Point IV
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SEEK EQUITABLE
RELIEF FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF
THE TRIAL COURT WITHIN THREE MONTHS
AFTER THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AND IS
AFFORDED NO REMEDY UNDER THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT.
On February 13, 1978, Defendant filed with the
Trial Court, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b)

(3) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

alleging as grounds therefor that fraud and misrepresentation had been committed by Plaintiffs in obtaining the
judgment.

Record at 212-214.

The judgments from which

Defendant sought relief consisted of the partial summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant Noel
L. Cook on Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint which was
entered on December 27, 1978, and the decree of foreclosurE
which was entered on January 10, 1977.

Record at 086-088

and 099-105.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:

- 14by the
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On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence,
suprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) when, for any
cause, the summons in an action has not
been personally served upon the defendant
as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action;
(5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (7) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or
(4), not more than three months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
(Emphasis added)
This Court has held that such Motions are ineffective if
made more than three months after the judgment is entered.
!1cGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972);
Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d 947 (1959).
The last judgment in this action was entered
January 10, 1976, the date on which it was signed and
filed.

Record at 099-105.

Rule 58A (c) of the Utah Rules
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of Civil Procedure provides that a "judgment is complete
and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the
creation of a lien on real property, when the same is
signed and filed as hereinabove provided."

Thus, for

purposes of Rule 60(b), Defendant had until April 10, 1977
to file his motion.

By failing to do so, his February 13,

1978 motion was ineffective and was properly denied.
Defendant argued to the Trial Court that his
filing of a timely appeal tolled the running of the time
within which a Rule 60(b) motion could properly be filed.
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was modeled
after Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A

distinction between the two rules is that the Federal Rule
affords parties one year in which to attack a judgment on
the grounds of mistake, newly discovered evidence, or

fra~.

Yet, in all other ways material to this action, the two
rules are identical.

In construing Rule 60 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Courts have unanimously
held that the filing of an appeal does not toll the period
of time in which parties may attack a final judgment.
v. District of Columbia, 543 Fed. 2d 917

~

(D.C. Cir., 1976);

Greater Boston Television Corporation v. F.C.C., 463 Fed. 2d
268

(D.C. Cir., 1971); Gulf Coast Building and Supply Com~
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Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical i·lorkers,
Local No. 458, A.F.L.-C.I.O., 460 Fed. 2d 105 (5th Cir.,
1972); Lairsey v. Advance Abrasures Company, 542 Fed. 2d
928 (5th Cir., 1976).

Under these decisions, a party

attacking a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)

(3)

(fraud) must file his motion within one year of the entry
of the final judgment by the trial court or his motion is
untimely.

Moreover, it has been held that Clause 6 (which

is identical to Clause 7 of the Utah Rule) and the first
five clauses of Rule 60(b) are mutually exclusive with the
result that Clause 6 affords no basis for relief at any
time if available under either of the earlier clauses.
Carr v. District of Columbia, supra.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Trial Court
read and examined the affidavits, memoranda and other documents and papers in the file, heard argument of counsel
and concluded that there was no fraudulent representation
or conduct on the part of the Plaintiffs or any other reason
for which the judgment entered on January 10, 1977, should
be vacated, and denied Defendant's motion.

Record at 311-313.

The burden was upon the Defendant to prove fraud
by clear and convincing evidence and the question as to
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whether the evidence is clear and convincing is usually
determined by the trier of the facts.

Pace v. Parrish,

247 P.2d 273, 122 Utah 141 (1952); Condas v. Adams, 388
P.2d 803, 15 Utah 2d 132 (1964).

Fraud is a wrong of

such nature that it must be shown by clear and convincing
proof and will not lie in mere suspicion or innuendo.
Lundstrom v. Rodeo Corporation of America,
17 Utah 2d 114 (1965).

~05

P.2d 339,

The long standing rules of appel-

late procedure require this Court to view the evidence in
light most favorable to the prevailing party below and not
to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
below on issues of fact determined from competent admissible evidence.
1978).

Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (Utah,

The Trial Court below properly ruled in this case

that there was no fraud committed by Plaintiffs and no
other reason for which the judgment should be vacated.

Point V
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S
FEES ARISING AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENSE
OF THIS APPEAL.
In the instant case the Defendant agreed to pay
reasonable attorney's fees necessitated by legal action to
enforce the note and to foreclose the mortgage.

Record at
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6, 8, 11.

As the record clearly shows, the Plaintiffs

brought suit in good faith to pursue their legal rights
and prevailed in the lower court.

Defendant's motion for

a new trial was denied and this Court affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court on the first appeal.

Defendant's

motions following the first appeal and this second appeal
constitute tactics calculated to delay and to deny Plaintiffs their legal rights and have resulted in burdening the
Plaintiffs with the expenses necessary to defend Defendant's
actions.
An award of attorney's fees on appeal is discre-

tionary with the Court.

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and

Inv. Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955).

Upon the

facts of this case it would be proper to award the Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees.

CONCLUSION
The appeal from the partial summary judgment
entered on December 27, 1976, was not timely filed and
this Court has already held that said judgment was properly
granted.

This Court has already properly held that Defen-

dant cannot avail himself of the defenses of waiver and
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improper acceleration of the mortgage due date and that
Defendant's claim that the Trial Court erred in denying
his motion for a new trial was without merit.

Defendant

failed to seek equitable relief from the final judgment
of the Trial Court within three months after the judgment
was entered and is, therefore, afforded no remedy under
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Moreover,

the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Defendant's motion to vacate judgment.

The decision of

the Trial Court should, therefore, be affirmed with costs
and reasonable attorney's fees to the Plaintiffs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

i!1:!::!

day of October I

1978.

~,icOb

'RObertF:Orton
HANSEN & ORTON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief this

1'/IJ...

day of October, 1978, to Noel L. Cook, 149 \vest

Center, Logan, Utah 84321.

Two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief
were also mailed this

;q.t.J...

day of October, 1978, to each

of the following attorneys for the other Defendants in this
case:
David Bean
Bean, Bean, Smedley and Starkweather
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2
Layton, Utah 84041
Robert Gutke
Preston, Harris, Harris, and Preston
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84320
Gary Anderson
Hillard, Gunnell and Lowe
175 East 1st North
Logan, Utah 84320
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Robert F. Orton
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